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DID.is
Universal resolver · DID Resolution v1 · W3C Candidate Recommendation Draft · Evidence, not scores

Identity, resolved.

Resolve supported decentralized identifiers, credentials, MCP servers, and A2A agents into verifiable evidence — what is proven, what is not, and exactly how DID.is knows.

Public DID lookups may be reflected in public observation history. Use private resolution for sensitive identifiers. Sign in for private resolution (supported methods and plan allowances apply).

Awaiting inputDID, DID URL, credential, JWT, MCP endpoint, A2A agent or origin
Trydid:web:did.isdid:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgj…
Delegation chain demo
§ Method

Four levels of disclosure

  1. Level 1
    Verdict

    One sentence per dimension of evidence, in plain language — including the ones that are not established.

  2. Level 2
    Evidence graph

    Every document, key, origin, certificate and linkage credential as a node; every relation as a verified, observed or merely declared edge.

  3. Level 3
    Telemetry

    The resolution as it happened: DNS pinning, TLS handshake, parsing, hash-chain and signature checks, with real timings.

  4. Level 4
    Substrate

    Raw JSON-LD, multicodec varint breakdowns, RFC 7638 thumbprints and the exact API calls to reproduce every result.

§ Establishes

What can be proven

Cryptographic control
Which keys a DID authorises, validated as curve points, per verification relationship.
Origin binding
A DIF Well-Known DID Configuration credential signed by the DID for the exact origin.
Transport
The TLS certificate actually presented, validated by rustls against the Mozilla root store.
Verifiable history
did:webvh hash chains, SCIDs, update-key signatures, pre-rotation and witness thresholds.
Credential integrity
Data Integrity and JOSE proofs, validity windows, fail-closed Bitstring Status List checks.
§ Refuses

What DID.is will never claim

Trust scores
No number can summarise evidence that is partly unknown. DID.is reports states, not grades.
Legal identity
A verified domain or key says nothing about the organisation behind it.
Issuer authority
A valid signature proves who signed — not that they were entitled to make the claim.
Agent behaviour
Delegation chains prove what was granted, never that an agent stays within it.
§ Conformance

Implemented standards

Full registry
  • DID Resolution v1 (CR Draft)W3C 1 Oct 2026 · HTTPS binding
  • did:webvh 1.0SCID, entry hashes, pre-rotation, witnesses
  • Data Integrity EdDSA / ECDSAeddsa-jcs-2022 · ecdsa-jcs-2019
  • VC Data Model 2.0+ VC-JWT 1.1, vc+jwt
  • Bitstring Status Listverified lists, fail-closed
  • DIF DID ConfigurationJWT + Data Integrity linkage
  • MCP 2026-07-28stateless discover; legacy fallback
  • A2A 1.0agent cards, JWS signatures
  • RDF canonicalization suitesreported as unsupported